Auctions

Ryan Davies. 2005. “Distributed Generalized Vickrey Auctions Based on the Dantzig-Wolfeand Benders Decomposition Methods for Linear Programs”. Download

David C. Parkes and Jayant R. Kalagnanam. 2005. “Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions.” Management Science, 51, Pp. 435–451. Download

Jonathan Bredin and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions.” In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'05), Pp. 50–59. Download

Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, and David C. Parkes. 2005. “More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives.” In Proc. 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05), Pp. 959–964. Download

Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods.” In Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), Pp. 165–174. Download

David C. Parkes and Tuomas Sandholm. 2005. “Optimize-and-Dispatch Architecture for Expressive Ad Auctions.” In Proceedings of First Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions. Download

Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions.” In Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, Pp. 71–80. Download

Jayant R. Kalagnanam and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design.” In Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era, edited by David Simchi-Levi, S. David Wu, and Max Shen, Pp. 143-212. Kluwer. Download

Ed Naim. 2004. “Consensus Mechanisms: Anytime Strategyproof Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions”. Download

Saurabh Sanghvi and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Hard-to-Manipulate Combinatorial Auctions”. Download

Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri. 2003. “Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), Pp. 166–175. Download

Kyna Fong. 2003. “Multi-stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design”. Download

Aditya V. Sunderam and David C. Parkes. 2003. “Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), Pp. 214–215. Download

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2003. “Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), Pp. 238–239. Download

David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. “An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction.” In Proc. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop on The Economics of the Internet. Stanford, CA.

David C. Parkes. 2002. “On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions”. Download

David C. Parkes. 2002. “Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems (LNAI 2531), edited by J. Padget, D. Parkes, N. Sadeh, O.Shehory, and W.Walsh, Pp. 103–122. Springer-Verlag. Download

Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2002. “Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation”. Download

David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2001. “An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train Scheduling.” In Proc. 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01), Pp. 43–50. Download

David C. Parkes. 2001. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency”. Download