Mechanism Design

2007
Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes. 2007. “Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations.” Journal of Economic Theory, 132, Pp. 335–366. Download
Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, and Quang Duong. 2007. “Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 30, Pp. 133–179. Download
David C. Parkes and Quang Duong. 2007. “An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains.” In Proc. 22nd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'07), Pp. 94–101. Download
Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, and David C. Parkes. 2007. “Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.” In Proc. 6th International Joint Conference on AutonomousAgents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'07), Pp. 110. Honolulu, Hawaii. Download
David C. Parkes. 2007. “Online Mechanisms.” In Algorithmic Game Theory, edited by Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani, Pp. 411–439. Cambridge University Press. Download
Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes. 2007. “On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.” In Proc. Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IX (AMEC'IX), Pp. 1-15. Honolulu, Hawaii. Download
2006
Ruggiero Cavallo. 2006. “Handling Self-Interest in Groups, with Minimal Cost.” In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'06), Nectar Paper Track, 2nd ed., 21: Pp. 1585. Boston, MA. Download
Takayuki Ito and David C. Parkes. 2006. “Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions.” In Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 1151–1158. Download
Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, and David C. Parkes. 2006. “MDPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems.” In Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 1397–1404. Download
Aditya Sanghvi. 2006. “An Online, Budget-Constrained Truthful Mechanism”.
Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh. 2006. “Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State.” In Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'06), Pp. 55–62. Cambridge, MA. Download
Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh. 2006. “Optimal Coordination of Loosely-Coupled Self-Interested Robots.” In Workshop on Auction Mechanisms for Robot Coordination, AAAI'06. Boston, MA. Download
Ruggiero Cavallo. 2006. “Optimal Decision-Making With Minimal Waste: Strategyproof Redistribution of VCG Payments.” In Proc. of the 5th Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 882-889. Hakodate, Japan. Download
Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. 2006. “An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, edited by Peyman Faratin and Juan Rodriguez Aguilar, 3425: Pp. 44. Springer Verlag. Download
Laura Kang and David C. Parkes. 2006. “Passive Verification of the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms in Open Environments.” In Proc. Eighth International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC'06), Pp. 19-30. Download
Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. 2006. “The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution.” In Proc. 7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), Pp. 180–189. Download
Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, and Avi Pfeffer. 2006. “Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms using Rights and Obligations.” In LNAI: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, edited by P. Faratin and J.A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, Pp. 188-201. Springer-Verlag. Download
2005
Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri. 2005. “Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions.” Decision Support Systems, 39, Pp. 105–121. Download
Yiling Chen. 2005. “Markets as An Information Aggregation Mechanism for Decision Support”. Download
Jonathan Bredin and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions.” In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'05), Pp. 50–59. Download

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