#  Fair Price Discrimination 

 



####  calendar\_today Date and Time 

 **October 20, 2023** 

 01:30PM - 02:30PM EDT 

####  pin\_drop Location 

 **SEC 1.413**  



 

 



 

 **Speaker:** Kangning Wang (stanford postdoc)

 **Title:** Fair Price Discrimination  
  
**Abstract:** A seller is pricing identical copies of a good to a stream of unit-demand buyers. Each buyer has a value on the good as his private information. The seller only knows the empirical value distribution of the buyer population and chooses the revenue-optimal price. We consider a widely studied third-degree price discrimination model where an information intermediary with perfect knowledge of the arriving buyer's value sends the seller a signal, which changes the seller's posterior and induces the seller to set a personalized price. We show the surprising existence of a novel signaling scheme that is "fair" to the buyer population: it simultaneously approximately maximizes all welfare functions that are non-negative, monotonically increasing, symmetric, and concave (including the utilitarian social welfare, the Nash welfare, and the max-min welfare). This is based on joint work ([https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07006](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__arxiv.org_abs_2305.07006&d=DwMFaQ&c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&r=ZOP6tLIqLOHbdgCvrXjUlPta0tw7K_-ivqiItQhh6LQ&m=8ynMVlNeFwWRMzUAqaE-gV3hoQ4INAOme_r5FreGpwJPakV-C4GW9P1uczBwwEbo&s=-7cqABkQQjLqK-47hRTCaiHq5pKQ8skjU3n49l7d5YI&e=)) with Siddhartha Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala, and Yiheng Shen.



 

 



 

 See also:- [ Fall 2023 EconCS Seminars ](/taxonomycalendarseminar/seminars-2023-fall)
- [ Seminar history ](/taxonomycalendarseminar/seminar-history)
 
 

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