"First Price Auction is 1-1/e^2 Efficient


Friday, October 28, 2022, 1:00pm to 2:30pm


SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

Yaonan Jin from Columbia university giving an in-person talk. He is a 4th year PhD student in Columbia University advised by Prof Xi Chen and Prof. Rocco Servedio. Here is the talk:
Title: "First Price Auction is 1-1/e^2 Efficient https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.01761 https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.04455" and abstract "We prove that, for the first-price auction, the tight Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the tight Price of Stability (PoS) are both 1-1/e^2 \approx 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].".

Since Yaonan is going to be here physically, he is excited to exchange ideas with everyone over Algorithmic Economics, Design and Analysis of Algorithms, and Randomness in Computation.
Please use the google sheet below to sign up for meet-ups or contact him directly at yj2552@columbia.edu.