Ben Edelman (Harvard) will be presenting at the EconCS seminar meeting this Friday, 4/29, at 1 pm ET. The seminar will take place in the usual room, SEC 1.413, and will also be streamed on zoom here.

Abstract: One of the oldest games in the game theory literature is the Colonel Blotto game, which models resource competition across simultaneous fronts (e.g., two-party elections across multiple districts). Even though the game itself is very easy to describe, it is notoriously difficult to identify explicit Nash equilibria. The technical difficulty boils down to finding a joint distribution that has desired single-variable marginals while satisfying a budget constraint. Recently, we introduced a natural multiplayer extension of Blotto and constructed equilibria for many parameter settings. We also introduced a Boolean version of the Blotto game. In this talk, I'll motivate the problem of finding Blotto equilibria, present some classic solutions in the two-player game, and sketch our multiplayer solutions for the classic continuous game and Boolean Blotto.

Based on joint work with Enric Boix-Adserà and Siddhartha Jayanti.