#  Persuasion and Optimal Stopping 

 



####  calendar\_today Date and Time 

 **November 1, 2024** 

 01:30PM - 02:30PM EDT 

####  pin\_drop Location 

 **SEC 1.413**  



 

 



 

 **Title**: Persuasion and Optimal Stopping

 (joint work with Sivakorn Sanguanmoo (MIT) and Weijie Zhong (Stanford GSB))

 **Abstract**: We analyze the interplay between persuasion, timing, and commitment. A principal conducts a sequence of statistical experiments to persuade an agent to stop at the right time, in the right state, and choose the right action. We develop a revelation principle—which allows us to leverage a first-order approach to solve the principal’s problem under commitment—and an anti-revelation principle—which allows us to transform the solution to restore dynamic consistency. We further characterize how time and action preferences jointly shape optimal strategies featuring suspense-generation which optimally concentrates the agent’s stopping time, and action-targeting which maximally correlates/anticorrelates persuasion and delay.



 

 



 

 See also:- [ EconCS Seminars ](/taxonomycalendarseminar/seminars)
- [ Fall 2024 EconCS Seminars ](/taxonomycalendarseminar/fall-2024-econcs-seminars)
- [ Seminar history ](/taxonomycalendarseminar/seminar-history)
 
 

 Share on:- [     Facebook ](#)
- [     Twitter ](#)
- [     Linkedin ](#)
 


 Save: [ Add to calendar calendar\_today ](https://econcs.seas.harvard.edu/node/1885561/event-feed.ics)  Copy link link