#  Two(!) Good To Be ... Monotonic 

 



####  calendar\_today Date and Time 

 **November 15, 2024** 

 01:30PM - 02:30PM EST 

####  pin\_drop Location 

 **SEC 1.413**  



 

 



 

 (joint works with Ran Ben Moshe, Noam Nisan, and Yannai Gonczarowski)

 **Abstract**: Selling multiple goods is a notoriously difficult problem. Inter alia, the following *non-monotonicity* phenomenon has been exhibited by Hart and Reny (2015): the willingness to pay of the buyer increases but the maximal revenue that the seller can extract decreases. We will show, first, that this effect is significant, and, second, that there is no way for the seller to mitigate it.



 

 



 

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