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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Seminar Schedule Fall 2022
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SUMMARY:Seminar Schedule Fall 2022
DESCRIPTION:<h2>	<strong><a data-url="https://econcs.seas.harvard.edu/event/seminar-schedule-fall-2022" href="internal:/event/seminar-schedule-fall-2022" target="_blank" title="">Fall 2022</a></strong></h2><p>	<span><span style="NewRoman,Times,serif">The EconCS Group holds an Economics and Computer Science research seminar each semester.</span></span></p><p>	<span><span>Fall 2022 meetings are held at 1-2:30 PM on Fridays.  Seminar Coordinators for Fall '22 are </span></span><a href="mailto:saisr@g.harvard.edu">Srivatsa R Sai</a> and <a href="mailto:dhalpern@g.harvard.edu">Daniel Halpern</a>.</p><p>	 </p><table height="696" width="695">	<tbody>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					September 9     				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Rik Sengupta				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Fairness Constraints on Graphs				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					September 16       				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Tarun Chitra				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					September 23     				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Jessie Finocchiaro				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Designing convex surrogates for discrete prediction tasks via embeddings				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					September 30     				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Martino Banchio				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Learning-Robust Mechanisms and the Coordination Bias				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					October<br>7       				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Gerdus Benade				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Stability, Fairness and the Pursuit of Happiness				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					October<br>14       				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					 				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					A Simple, General Framework for Fair Allocation Under Matroid Rank Valuations				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					October<br>21       				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Moon Duchin				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Sampling partitions, with applications to redistricting				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				<p>					October 28 				</p>			</td>			<td>				<p>					Yaonan Jin				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					<span><span>"First Price Auction is 1-1/e^2 Efficient"</span></span>				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				November 4			</td>			<td>				<p>					<span>Matheus V. X. Ferreira</span>				</p>			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules			</td>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				November 11			</td>			<td>				Lirong Xia			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					The Smoothed and Semi-Random Possibilities of Social Choice				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				November 18			</td>			<td>				Shiri Ron			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design				</p>			</td>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>		</tr>		<tr>			<td>				December 2			</td>			<td>				 Clayton Thomas			</td>			<td>				 			</td>			<td>				<p>					Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions				</p>			</td>		</tr>	</tbody></table>
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DTSTART:20230124T170000Z
DTEND:20231201T183000Z
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