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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints
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SUMMARY:Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints
DESCRIPTION:<p>	Negin Golrezaei, MIT Sloan</p><p>	March 10, 2023, SEC 1.413 (in-person)</p><p>	<em>Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints</em></p><p>	Abstract: In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channel and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.</p><p>	Based on this paper: <a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__arxiv.org_abs_2302.01523&amp;d=DwMFaQ&amp;c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&amp;r=ZOP6tLIqLOHbdgCvrXjUlPta0tw7K_-ivqiItQhh6LQ&amp;m=I6N0XlBITiLbWmk30DlOQyAz78zMcbgRQJZs04glFaAuwoW_OcBA78wkyRTNOHty&amp;s=gu9micR8osMRGNSEbiiQi1QECXsRzC_lbE_KFXiYIVs&amp;e=">https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.01523</a></p>
LOCATION:SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTART:20230310T180000Z
DTEND:20230310T190000Z
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