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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Contract Design in Combinatorial Settings
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SUMMARY:Contract Design in Combinatorial Settings
DESCRIPTION:<p>	<strong>Speaker:</strong> Tomer Ezra (Harvard)<br><br><strong>Title:</strong> Contract Design in Combinatorial Settings<br><br><strong>Abstract:</strong> We study two combinatorial settings of the contract design problem, in which a principal wants to delegate the execution of a costly task. In the first setting, the principal delegates the task to an agent that can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an associated cost. The principal receives a reward which is a combinatorial function of the actions taken by the agent. In the second setting, we study the single-principal multi-agent contract problem, in which the principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. We design (approximately) optimal algorithms for both settings along with impossibility results for various classes of combinatorial functions.<br><br>This talk is based on joint works with Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, and Maya Schlesinger.</p>
LOCATION:SEC 1.413
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTART:20240322T173000Z
DTEND:20240322T183000Z
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