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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Two(!) Good To Be ... Monotonic
PRODID:-//Harvard events data//EN
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UID:event_1891056_0
SUMMARY:Two(!) Good To Be ... Monotonic
DESCRIPTION:<p>	(joint works with Ran Ben Moshe, Noam Nisan, and Yannai Gonczarowski)</p><p>	<strong>Abstract</strong>: Selling multiple goods is a notoriously difficult problem. Inter alia, the following <em>non-monotonicity</em> phenomenon has been exhibited by Hart and Reny (2015): the willingness to pay of the buyer increases but the maximal revenue that the seller can extract decreases. We will show, first, that this effect is significant, and, second, that there is no way for the seller to mitigate it.</p>
LOCATION:SEC 1.413
STATUS:CONFIRMED
DTSTART:20241115T183000Z
DTEND:20241115T193000Z
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