Auctions

Christopher Thorpe. 2008. “Provably Correct, Secrecy Preserving Computationand its Applications in Auctions and Securities Exchanges”. Download

Katherine L. Milkman, James Burns, David C. Parkes, Greg Barron, and Kagan Tumer. 2008. “Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism.” Applied Economics Research Bulletin, Special Issue I, Pp. 106–141. Download

Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes. 2007. “Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations.” Journal of Economic Theory, 132, Pp. 335–366. Download

Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, and Quang Duong. 2007. “Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 30, Pp. 133–179. Download

Laura Kang and David C. Parkes. 2007. “A Decentralized Auction Framework to Promote Efficient Resource Allocation in Open Computational Grids.” In Proc. Joint Workshop on The Economics of Networked Systems and Incentive-Based Computing (NetEcon-IBC). San Diego, CA. Download

Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, and David C. Parkes. 2007. “Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.” In Proc. 6th International Joint Conference on AutonomousAgents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'07), Pp. 110. Honolulu, Hawaii. Download

David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, and Christopher Thorpe. 2007. “Practical Secrecy-Preserving, Verifiably Correct and Trustworthy Auctions.” Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 7, Pp. 294–312. Download

Sébastien Lahaie and David Pennock. 2007. “Revenue Analysis of a Family of Ranking Rules for Keyword Auctions.” In Proc. 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'07), Pp. 50–56. Download

Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes. 2007. “On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.” In Proc. Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IX (AMEC'IX), Pp. 1-15. Honolulu, Hawaii. Download

Jimmy Sun. 2007. “The Role of Value of Information Based Meta-reasoning in Adaptive Sponsored Search Auctions”. Download

Sébastien Lahaie. 2006. “An Analysis of Alternative Slot Auction Designs for Sponsored Search.” In Proc. 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), Pp. 218–227. Download

Takayuki Ito and David C. Parkes. 2006. “Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions.” In Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 1151–1158. Download

David C. Parkes. 2006. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions.” In Combinatorial Auctions, edited by Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg. MIT Press. Download

Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. 2006. “An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, edited by Peyman Faratin and Juan Rodriguez Aguilar, 3425: Pp. 44. Springer Verlag. Download

David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, and Christopher Thorpe. 2006. “Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions.” In Proc. 8th International Conferenceon Electronic Commerce (ICEC'06), Pp. 70–81. Download

Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. 2006. “The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution.” In Proc. 7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), Pp. 180–189. Download

John Lai. 2005. “Accelerated Implementations of the Ascending Proxy Auction”. Download

Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri. 2005. “Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions.” Decision Support Systems, 39, Pp. 105–121. Download

David C. Parkes. 2005. “Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation.” Annals of Mathematics and AI, 44, Pp. 269–302. Download

Rui Dong. 2005. “Combinatorial Clock Auction for Airport Time Slots: An Agent-Based Analysis”. Download