Auctions

David C. Parkes. 2001. “An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation.” In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, Pp. 78–87. AAAI Press. Download

David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2000. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice.” In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'00), Pp. 74–81. Download

David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2000. “Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment.” In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'00), Pp. 82–89. Download

David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, and Dean P. Foster. 1999. “Accounting for cognitive costs in on-line auction design.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (LNAI 1571), edited by P Noriega and C Sierra, Pp. 25–40. Springer-Verlag. Download

David C. Parkes. 1999. “iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction.” In Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'99), Pp. 148–157. Download

David C. Parkes. 1999. “Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems.” In Proc. IJCAI-99 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Pp. 206–219. Stockholm, Sweden. Download