Mechanism Design

2007
Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes. 2007. “On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.” In Proc. Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IX (AMEC'IX), Pp. 1-15. Honolulu, Hawaii. Download
2006
Ruggiero Cavallo. 2006. “Handling Self-Interest in Groups, with Minimal Cost.” In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'06), Nectar Paper Track, 2nd ed., 21: Pp. 1585. Boston, MA. Download
Takayuki Ito and David C. Parkes. 2006. “Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions.” In Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 1151–1158. Download
Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, and David C. Parkes. 2006. “MDPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems.” In Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 1397–1404. Download
Aditya Sanghvi. 2006. “An Online, Budget-Constrained Truthful Mechanism”.
Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh. 2006. “Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State.” In Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'06), Pp. 55–62. Cambridge, MA. Download
Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh. 2006. “Optimal Coordination of Loosely-Coupled Self-Interested Robots.” In Workshop on Auction Mechanisms for Robot Coordination, AAAI'06. Boston, MA. Download
Ruggiero Cavallo. 2006. “Optimal Decision-Making With Minimal Waste: Strategyproof Redistribution of VCG Payments.” In Proc. of the 5th Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS'06), Pp. 882-889. Hakodate, Japan. Download
Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. 2006. “An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, edited by Peyman Faratin and Juan Rodriguez Aguilar, 3425: Pp. 44. Springer Verlag. Download
Laura Kang and David C. Parkes. 2006. “Passive Verification of the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms in Open Environments.” In Proc. Eighth International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC'06), Pp. 19-30. Download
Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes. 2006. “The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution.” In Proc. 7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), Pp. 180–189. Download
Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, and Avi Pfeffer. 2006. “Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms using Rights and Obligations.” In LNAI: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, edited by P. Faratin and J.A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, Pp. 188-201. Springer-Verlag. Download
2005
Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri. 2005. “Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions.” Decision Support Systems, 39, Pp. 105–121. Download
Yiling Chen. 2005. “Markets as An Information Aggregation Mechanism for Decision Support”. Download
Jonathan Bredin and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions.” In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'05), Pp. 50–59. Download
Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods.” In Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), Pp. 165–174. Download
Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Preference-Based Characterizations of Truthfulness and the Limited Expressiveness of Order-Based Domains.” In Proc. Workshop on Preference Handling, Pp. 2. Edinburgh, Scotland. Download
2004
Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions.” In Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, Pp. 71–80. Download
David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh, and Dimah Yanovsky. 2004. “Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design.” In Proc. 18th Annual Conf. on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS'04), Pp. 1049-1056. Download
Ed Naim. 2004. “Consensus Mechanisms: Anytime Strategyproof Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions”. Download

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