Regret Minimization for Repeated First-Price Auction and Bilateral Trade.

Time & Location: Friday, February 14, 1:30pm - 2:30pm at SEC LL 2.221

Speaker: Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome)

Title: Regret Minimization for Repeated First-Price Auction and Bilateral Trade.    

Abstract: We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions and bilateral trade games. We consider stochastic and adversarial settings and different feedback models that define the amount of information disclosed to the mechanism. For first-price auctions, we focus on regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item’s value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction’s transparency, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. For bilateral trade, where an adversary generates the valuations of sellers and buyers, we characterize the regret regimes for fixed-price mechanisms under different feedback models in the two cases where the learner can post the same or different prices to buyers and sellers. 

Joint work with authors: Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, and Federico Fusco 

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