Logic-based Automated Mechanism Design


Friday, May 13, 2022, 1:00pm to 2:30pm



Munyque Mittelmann will be presenting at the EconCS seminar meeting this Friday, 5/13, at 1 pm ET. The seminar will be held Zoom only, accessible at the usual link here. Hope to see you there :).

Title: Logic-based Automated Mechanism Design

Abstract: Mechanism Design (MD) aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information, with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to verification and synthesis of mechanisms. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas, and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we show how the Automated MD problem can be rephrased as a synthesis problem, where mechanisms are automatically synthesized from a partial or complete specification in a high-level logical language.