Past EconCS Seminars

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134 results

134 results

Spring EconCS 2025 Seminars
February 7, 2025
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EST
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SEC LL 2.221
In Person
Time & Location: Friday, February 07, 1:30pm - 2:30pm at SEC LL 2.221 Speaker 1: André Cruz (PhD student at MPI and currently visiting Rediet Adebe at Harvard) Title: Evaluating language models as risk scorers Abstract: Current LLM benchmarks...

Contract Design Under Uncertainty
December 13, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EST
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SEC 1.413
In Person
Abstract: As algorithms increasingly interact with rational, self-interested individuals, their design must take participants’ incentives into account. The traditional focus in algorithmic game theory literature has been the design of algorithms that...

Human Learning about A.I.
December 6, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EST
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SEC 1.413
In Person
Abstract: We study how people form expectations about the performance of artificial intelligence (AI) and consequences for AI adoption. Our main hypothesis is that people rely on human-relevant task features when evaluating AI, treating AI failures on...

Two(!) Good To Be ... Monotonic
November 15, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EST
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SEC 1.413
In Person
(joint works with Ran Ben Moshe, Noam Nisan, and Yannai Gonczarowski) Abstract: Selling multiple goods is a notoriously difficult problem. Inter alia, the following non-monotonicity phenomenon has been exhibited by Hart and Reny (2015): the willingness to...

Infinite Horizon Markov Exchange Economy (Sadie Zhao)
November 8, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EST
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SEC 1.413
In Person
We introduce the infinite horizon Markov exchange economy, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that explicitly incorporates time and uncertainty, generalizing both the Radner stochastic exchange economy and the infinite horizon...

Persuasion and Optimal Stopping
November 1, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EDT
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SEC 1.413
In Person
Title: Persuasion and Optimal Stopping (joint work with Sivakorn Sanguanmoo (MIT) and Weijie Zhong (Stanford GSB)) Abstract: We analyze the interplay between persuasion, timing, and commitment. A principal conducts a sequence of statistical experiments to...

When Does Prediction Improve Resource Allocation?
October 25, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EDT
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SEC 1.413
In Person
Abstract: Algorithmic predictions are increasingly guiding societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for intervention. Fueling their adoption is their strong performance in standard evaluation settings. Yet, these settings are narrow and...

On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
October 18, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EDT
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SEC 1.413
In Person
Abstract: The immense success of ML systems relies heavily on large-scale high-quality data. The high demand for data has led to several paradigms that involve selling, exchanging, and sharing data. This naturally motivates studying economic processes...

Fair allocation of indivisible chores via earning-restricted equilibria

October 11, 2024
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1:30PM - 2:30PM EDT
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SEC 1.413
In Person
Abstract: Fair division is an age-old problem that deals with the allocation of items among agents with diverse preferences in a fair and efficient way. It naturally arises in various real-life situations, from interpersonal to international conflicts. In...