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Speaker: Moon Duchin from the MGGG Redistricting Lab at Tufts. She will be speaking in-person on: Sa mpling partitions, with applications to redistricting Abstract: In the world of gerrymandering, there are many reasons to want to take a “representative...

Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with matroid rank valuations. We present a simple framework that efficiently computes any fairness objective that satisfies some mild assumptions. Along with...

Yaonan Jin from Columbia university giving an in-person talk. He is a 4th year PhD student in Columbia University advised by Prof Xi Chen and Prof. Rocco Servedio. Here is the talk: Title: "First Price Auction is 1-1/e^2 Efficient https://arxiv.org/abs...

Shiri Ron (Weizmann Institute) will be speaking in-person: On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design Abstract: We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that...

Speaker: Martino Banchio Title: Learning-Robust Mechanisms and the Coordination Bias Abstract: We develop a theoretical model to study strategic interactions between adaptive learning algorithms. Applying continuous-time techniques, we uncover the...

This Friday, 1pm-2pm in SEC 1.413, Clayton Thomas (Princeton) will be speaking in-person on: Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions Abstract: A menu description defines a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1) uses the reports of other...

Gerdus Benade (BU) will be speaking in-person on his paper: Abstract: Top-k recommendations are ubiquitous, but are they stable? We study whether, given complete information, buyers and sellers prefer to continue participating in a platform using top-k...

Lirong Xia (RPI) will be speaking over Zoom on: The Smoothed and Semi-Random Possibilities of Social Choice Abstract: Social choice studies how to aggregate agents' preferences to make a collective decision. It plays a critical role in many group decision...

This Friday, 1pm-2pm in SEC 1.413, we will be having our final EconCS seminar of the semester, featuring Andreas Haupt from MIT. He will be speaking in-person on: Controlling Cooperation in Strategic Environments Abstract: In many strategic environments...

Speaker: Matheus V. X. Ferreira Title: Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules https://arxiv.org/pdf/2209.15569.pdf Abstract: Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless...