Spring 2024 EconCS Seminars

Speaker: Eden Saig Title: Delegated Classification Abstract: What happens when machine learning is outsourced to profit-maximizing agents? In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning tasks. We model...

Speaker: Yonatan Sompolinsky (Harvard) Abstract: We tackle the problem of Miners Extracted Value (MEV), where a transaction sequencer extracts profit off users, by frontrunning pending transactions, sandwiching others, or carrying out any other form of...

Speaker: Berk Ustun (UCSD) Title: When Personalization Harms Performance Abstract: Clinical prediction models often encode group attributes like sex, age, and HIV status for personalization – i.e., to assign more accurate predictions to heterogeneous...

Speaker: John Horton (MIT) Title: Automated Social Science: A Structural Causal Model-Based Approach Abstract: We present an approach for automatically generating and testing, in silico, social scientific hypotheses. This automation is made possible by...

Speaker: Zhuoran Yang Title: Reinforcement Learning Meets Bilevel Optimization: Learning Leader-Follower Games with Sample Efficiency Abstract: In this talk, I will introduce methods that modify the optimism principle for reinforcement learning in leader...

1st Speaker: Shi Feng (Harvard) Title: Reveal Planning Capability of Autoregressive Learning in Large Language Models Abstract: Search and planning are fundamental constructs of human intelligence, involved in almost every aspect of our daily lives, from...

Speaker: Tomer Ezra (Harvard) Title: Contract Design in Combinatorial Settings Abstract: We study two combinatorial settings of the contract design problem, in which a principal wants to delegate the execution of a costly task. In the first setting, the...

Speaker: Martin Bichler Abstract: Equilibrium problems in Bayesian auction games can be described as systems of differential equations. Depending on the model assumptions, these equations might be such that we do not have an exact mathematical solution...

Speaker: Brian Zhang (CMU) Title: Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games Abstract: We introduce a unified framework for understanding optimal equilibria in general games by explicitly augmenting the game...

Speaker: Yichi Zhang (University of Michigan) Talk Title: Eliciting Honest Information From Authors Using Sequential Review Abstract: In the setting of conference peer review, the conference aims to accept high-quality papers and reject low-quality papers...