Spring 2023 EconCS Seminars

Spring 2023

The EconCS Group holds an Economics & Computer Science research seminar each semester. Spring '23 meetings are at 1 - 2:30 PM on Fridays in SEC 1.413. Seminar Coordinators are Jamie Tucker-Foltz & Gary Ma. SEC 1.413 is on ground level at the NW corner of SEC, which is open to the public. They are in-person with an option to Zoom in, with a few only virtual on this link: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09 (Password: econcs)

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Google Maps link to SEC


schedule
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2023 May 05

Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI)

1:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413

Aviad Rubinstein (Stanford)

Friday, May 5, in-person SEC 1.413

Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI)

Abstract:

Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (A-CEEI) is an equilibrium-based solution concept for fair division of discrete items to agents with combinatorial demands. We developed a new heuristic A-CEEI algorithm that significantly outperforms the (previous) commercial state-of-the-art and is now in production on real course allocation problems....

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2023 Apr 21

Marketplace Experimentation and Interference Effects

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

 

This Friday, 1-2pm in SEC 1.413, Hannah Li will be speaking in person on:

Marketplace Experimentation and Interference Effects

Abstract:

Platforms often rely on experiments (A/B tests) to aid decision-making. However, in many marketplace experiments, interactions between users can create interference effects that lead to biased estimates. We develop mathematical models to capture these interference effects and study the biases that arise. In particular, we are able to highlight and formalize the relationship...

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2023 Apr 14

A Simple Theory of Vampire Attacks

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

Zoom at the link: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

Scott Kominers (Harvard Business School)

A Simple Theory of Vampire Attacks

Abstract:

Firms often find it valuable to lock in repeat consumers, and they often do so via loyalty programs such as frequent-flyer miles or discounts for returning consumers. We introduce a model of loyalty programs in the presence of competition and show that, surprisingly, such programs result in higher prices for all consumers in equilibrium.

However, competitors may also find it valuable to identify repeat consumers of other firms and convince them to...

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2023 Apr 07

Included-variable bias and everything but the kitchen sink

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09
This Friday, 1-2pm in SEC 1.413, we are very excited to have Sharad Goel (Harvard Kennedy School) speak in-person on:

Included-variable bias and everything but the kitchen sink

Abstract: When estimating the risk of an adverse outcome, common statistical guidance is to include all available factors to maximize predictive performance. Similarly, in observational studies of discrimination, general practice is to adjust for all potential confounds to...
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2023 Mar 24

Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

Elisabeth C. Paulson (Harvard Business School)

Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation Balancing

Abstract: This work proposes two new dynamic assignment algorithms to match refugees and asylum seekers to geographic localities within a host country. The first, currently implemented in a multi-year pilot in Switzerland, seeks to maximize the average predicted employment level (or any measured outcome of interest) of refugees through a minimum-discord online assignment algorithm. Although the proposed algorithm achieves near-optimal expected...

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2023 Mar 10

Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

Negin Golrezaei, MIT Sloan

March 10, 2023, SEC 1.413 (in-person)

Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints

Abstract: In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does...

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2023 Mar 03

Tao Lin & Lily Xu talks

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

Tao Lin

Persuading a Behavioral Agent: Approximately Best Responding and Learning

Abstract: The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes that the receiver is fully Bayesian and best responds to the sender’s signaling scheme. In this talk, I will talk about two alternative (and more realistic) behavioral models for the receiver: (1) approximately best responding, and (2) learning. We analyze how these two behavioral models affect the sender’s utility in the Bayesian persuasion problem. We first show that, under natural assumptions, approximately best-...

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2023 Feb 24

Auctions between Regret-Minimizing Agents: On Learning Dynamics and User Incentives

1:00pm

Location: 

The Zoom link is as usual: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09 (password: econcs)
This Friday 1-2pm fully on Zoom, we have Yoav Kolumbus (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) on:

Auctions between Regret-Minimizing Agents: On Learning Dynamics and User Incentives

Abstract: The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. In this talk we will discuss the strategic situations that the users of such automated learning agents are facing. We propose to view the outcomes of the agents’ dynamics as inducing a “meta-game” between the users....
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2023 Feb 17

The Method of Equal Shares for Participatory Budgeting

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, and streamed via Zoom: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

This Friday, 1-2pm in SEC 1.413, we are very excited to have Dominik Peters (LAMSADE) speak in-person on:

The Method of Equal Shares for Participatory Budgeting

Abstract: In Participatory Budgeting, cities allow their residents to influence the...

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2023 Feb 10

The Method of Equal Shares for Participatory Budgeting

1:00pm to 2:00pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413, & streamed via Zoom at: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/95184948637?pwd=bXBIc2U5MEZ0QmRUb01WQ0o0SXRCdz09

February 17, 1-2pm in SEC 1.413

Dominik Peters (LAMSADE)

The Method of Equal Shares for Participatory Budgeting

In Participatory Budgeting, cities allow their residents to influence the city’s budget through a vote. The standard voting method simply sorts the project proposals by their number of votes, and then greedily selects projects until the budget limit is reached. We have developed a new voting rule, the Method of Equal Shares, that leads to fairer outcomes. It does this by providing...

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2023 Feb 10

Bailey Flanigan & He Sun

1:00pm to 2:30pm

Location: 

SEC 1.413 https://goo.gl/maps/UjUiWMGZCEGh5qMr9
Fridays 1-2pm in SEC 1.413 

Bailey Flanigan (Carnegie Mellon)

Distortion under public-spirited voting

Abstract: A key promise of democratic voting is that, by accounting for all constituents’ preferences, it produces decisions that benefit the constituency overall. It is alarming, then, that all deterministic voting rules have unbounded distortion: all such rules — even under reasonable conditions — will sometimes select outcomes that yield essentially no value for constituents. In this talk — based on our paper...

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