Skip to main content

Spring EconCS 2025 Seminars

Content tagged with Spring EconCS 2025 Seminars

Not finding what you're looking for? Try using Advanced Search.
Not finding what you're looking for? Try using Advanced Search.

Information Disclosure Makes Simple Mechanisms Competitive

Event
Speaker: Yingkai Li (Assistant Professor in Economics at the National University of Singapore) Abstract: In classical mechanism design, the prevailing assumption is that the information structure about agents' types is exogenous. This assumption...

Relying on the Metrics of Evaluated Agents

Event
Speaker 1: Serena Wang ( Postdoctoral Fellow working with Ariel Procaccia at Harvard) Abstract: Online platforms and regulators face a continuing problem of designing effective evaluation metrics. While tools for collecting and processing data continue to...

Contracting with a Learning Agent

Event
Speaker: Yoav Kolumbus ( Assistant Research Professor - Center for Data Science for Enterprise and Society at Cornell University) Title: Contracting with a Learning Agent Abstract: Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean...

Challenges in learning under competition

Event
Speaker: Ana Andreea-Stoica (Research Group Leader - Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, Tuebingen) Title: Challenges in learning under competition Abstract: In this talk, I will describe technical challenges in learning under competition, with...