Auctions

2005
Jonathan Bredin and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions.” In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'05), Pp. 50–59. Download
Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, and David C. Parkes. 2005. “More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives.” In Proc. 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05), Pp. 959–964. Download
Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, and David C. Parkes. 2005. “Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods.” In Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), Pp. 165–174. Download
David C. Parkes and Tuomas Sandholm. 2005. “Optimize-and-Dispatch Architecture for Expressive Ad Auctions.” In Proceedings of First Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions. Download
2004
Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions.” In Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, Pp. 71–80. Download
Jayant R. Kalagnanam and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design.” In Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era, edited by David Simchi-Levi, S. David Wu, and Max Shen, Pp. 143-212. Kluwer. Download
Ed Naim. 2004. “Consensus Mechanisms: Anytime Strategyproof Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions”. Download
Saurabh Sanghvi and David C. Parkes. 2004. “Hard-to-Manipulate Combinatorial Auctions”. Download
2003
Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri. 2003. “Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), Pp. 166–175. Download
Kyna Fong. 2003. “Multi-stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design”. Download
Aditya V. Sunderam and David C. Parkes. 2003. “Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), Pp. 214–215. Download
Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2003. “Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation.” In Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), Pp. 238–239. Download
2002
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2002. “An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction.” In Proc. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop on The Economics of the Internet. Stanford, CA.
David C. Parkes. 2002. “On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions”. Download
David C. Parkes. 2002. “Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions.” In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems (LNAI 2531), edited by J. Padget, D. Parkes, N. Sadeh, O.Shehory, and W.Walsh, Pp. 103–122. Springer-Verlag. Download
Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2002. “Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation”. Download
2001
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2001. “An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train Scheduling.” In Proc. 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01), Pp. 43–50. Download
David C. Parkes. 2001. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency”. Download
David C. Parkes. 2001. “An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation.” In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, Pp. 78–87. AAAI Press. Download
2000
David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar. 2000. “Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice.” In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'00), Pp. 74–81. Download

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