Mechanism Design

2014
Perry Green. 2014. “Good Advice Costs Nothing and it's Worth the Price: Incentive Compatible Recommendation Mechanisms forExploring Unknown Options”. Download
Bo Waggoner and Yiling Chen. 2014. “Output Agreement Mechanisms and Common Knowledge.” In Proceedings of the 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP'14). Download
Paul Duetting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John Lai, Benjamin Lubin, and David C. Parkes. 2014. “Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers.” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3, 1, Pp. 5. Download
Yiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David Pennock, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 2014. “Removing Arbitrage from Wagering Mechanisms.” In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'14), Pp. 377-394. Download
Sven Seuken and David C. Parkes. 2014. “Sybil-proof Accounting Mechanisms with Transitive Trust.” In Proceedings of the 13th Int. Conf. on Automonous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'14), Pp. 205-212. Download
2013
Peter Zhang. 2013. “Beyond the Bayesian Truth Serum: The Knowledge Free Peer Prediction Mechanism”. Download
Yaron Singer. 2013. “Budget Feasible Mechanism Design.” ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 12, 2, Pp. 24-31. Download
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, and Brendan Lucier. 2013. “Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium.” In Proceedings of the 45th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC-13), Pp. 61-70. Download
Valentin Robu, David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito, and Nicholas R. Jennings. 2013. “Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders.” In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013), Pp. 339-345. Download
Valentin Robu, Enrico H. Gerding, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, and Nicholas R. Jennings. 2013. “An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging.” Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 48, Pp. 175-230. Download
Yaron Singer and Manas Mittal. 2013. “Pricing Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets.” In Proceedings of the ACM International World Wide Web Conference (WWW-13), Pp. 1157-1166. Download
Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, and Renato Paes Leme. 2013. “Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale.” In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-13), Pp. 417-434. Download
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, and Brendan Lucier. 2013. “Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient.” In Proceedings of the 45th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC-13), Pp. 201-210. Download
Michal Feldman and Yoav Wilf. 2013. “Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective.” In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-13), Pp. 873-890. Download
Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, and Salil Vadhan. 2013. “Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy.” In Proceedings of of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC13), Pp. 215-232. Download
2012
Michal Feldman and John Lai. 2012. “Mechanisms and impossibilities for truthful, envy-free allocations.” In Proceedings of the Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'12), Pp. 120-131. Download
Swara S. Kopparty. 2012. “Modeling Task Allocation with Time using Auction Mechanisms”. Download
John K. Lai and David C. Parkes. 2012. “Monotone Branch-and-Bound Search for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions.” In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '12), Pp. 705-722. Download
Paul Duetting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, and David C. Parkes. 2012. “Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers.” In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '12), Pp. 477-494. Download
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, and Piotr Sankowski. 2012. “Revenue Maximizing Envy-free Multi-unit Auctions with Budgets.” In In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-12), Pp. 532-549. Download

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